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Resumen
Una psicología crítica de la salud necesita una reflexión teórica acerca de
su objeto bási:::o, la salud. En este artículo, primero que todo se considera
la salud como es entendida por la tradición fenomenológica. Desde esta
perspectiva, la salud no es una cualidad objetiva, sino una forma de vivir,
de ser en el mundo. En contraste, el estar saludable es una salud estanda~
rizada, es decir, la salud definida económica y médicamente. La salud
estandarizada es una cualidad objetificable. Sin embargo, también es la
forma contemporánea de estar saludable, de modo que es más que una
simple objetivización. Examinada críticamente, la salud estandarizada tiene
dos limitaciones principales, la contraproductividad y un sacrificio de
fantasías de totalidad. El artículo concluye con recomendaciones para una
psicología crÍl:ica de la salud: no promocionar la salud estandarizada y
concentrarse en los fines o propósitos de la búsqueda de la salud.
Palabras claves: Salud, fenomenología, psicología crítica de la salud,
contraproduc1:ividad, psicoanálisis lacaniano
HEAL TH IN THE LIGHT OF A
CRITICAL HEAL TH PSYCHOLOGY
With the growth of health psychology, it is important more than ever
to think theoretically about health and illness. Ir is much too easy
and even inevitable that health psychology will take over uncritically
biomedical and biopsychosocial formulations of them. While there
has been much interesting critical work of illness, there is less on health
itself. The purpose of this paper is to further a critical health psycho-
logy by exploring the meanings and praxes of health roday. In the
first part, I will consider health as an existential condition, as a way of
being-in-the-world, drawing on contemporary phenomenological
thought and c1assical medicine. Following that, I will explore the
meanings of health, when health is defined by medical, political, and
economic factors.
Health as a mode oí existing
I begin with a brief presentation of health as offered by Hans-Georg
Gadamer, one of the leading phenomenological philosophers of the
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twentieth century. He takes health to be a mode of existing, "this
condition of nOI noticing, of being unhindered, of being ready for and
open to everything" (Gadamer, 1996, p. 73). It is an unmarked state,
unmarked (Radley, 1994,p. 6), noticeable primarily in its sense of being
alive. In health, my lived body "dis-appears" to use Leder's (1990)term,
becomes the means by which I engage the world. In being healthy, I am
able to move.
From the Greeks onward, self-movement has defined living beings.
Self-movement is a power over oneself, and for the human order, as
Gadamer (1996, p. 145) writes, power over one's self is awareness of
one' s powers. This power that is aware of itself and can act upon
itself, especially in thought and recollection, points to a particular
kind of unity 01 existence: "Whatever is 'one' is a 'self,' and it is a self
because it relates to itself' (Gadamer, 1996, p. 149). In a fundamental
way, health is wholeness. Not only in oneself, for there is no health
in this sense unless there are worlds to live in: Hence the relational
meaning of health, according to both illich and Gadamer. As being-
in-the-world, health is a way of being-in-the-world that facilitates
whatever else I would do. Health does not qualify a world or an en-
vironment in some abstract way, but in terms of human dwelling and
working. Hippocrates depicted the worldly character of being healthy
in Air, Water, Places, describing health in terms of the possibilities
created for human dwelling. In a fundamental way, for Hippocrates,
health is only definable in terms of a particular place and ways of life
fitting to that place. The balance that defines health is appropriate
only there.
Measures and the appropriate
Gadamer notes lhat for Plato, there are two kinds of measures. One is
used with all things, such as the measurement of length. The other is the
measure appropriate to the thing itself. This measure is intrinsic to each
thing, the appropriate or the fitting. The nineteenth century's
establishment of criteria for the "normal," at once descriptive (statistically
normal) and nonnative (ought statements) broke with this Platonic insight,
which is not identical with the notion of "individual differences." The
77
Psicología desde el Caribe. Universidad del Norte. No. 11: 75-93, 2003
78 ROBERT KUGELMANN
notion of individual differences presupposes common traits, which can
be present in an individual to a greater 01' lesser degree. The older sense of
measure brooked no external norm. The fitting in this sense is outside
mimetic desire (Girard, 1977).
Werner Jaeger (1944), writing of Greek medicine, addresses tbis concept
in the same context that Gadamer does: "the real doctor is recognized by
his power to estimate what is appropriate for each individual case ....
There is no standard of weight 01' measure by which one could fix quantities
on a general basis. That must be done wholly by feeling (aisth&is),which
is the only thing that can compensate for the lack of a rational standard"
(p. 18). Feeling, aisth&is, is sensation, understanding at the leve! of the
particular: One senses what is appropriate in a judgment that is close to
the actual. Jaeger points out that Aristotle's analysis of ethical action is
guided by Greek medicine, and that the terms he used to judge action are
those also used to determine the individual situation in medicine: "excess,
deficiency, the mean and the right proportion, aiming, and perception
(aisthesis)" (p. 25). A later Greek writer, Diocles, in his On Regimen in
Health, developed this idea of the suitable (harmattan): "That which is
suitable is the behaviour dictated by tact and by a delicate perception of
the appropriate in every relationship" aaeger, 1944, p.4 2). While a health
regirnen is not the same as ethical action, there was in Greek thought an
affmity between them, because for the Greeks, as was typical in traditional
cultures, the nat~ral order was one with the moral order. In this regard,
health as a physical virtue has strong affinities with other physical virtues,
especially beauty and strength. The three be!ong together experientially,
and while we also understand the distinctions between them, we also live
their unity.
Health and illness
Whereas health often hides itself in our activities, manifested only in that
we can act and that we enjoy being active, illness resists uso For the Greeks,
illness was a form ofpanas, work ortoil. Panaswas also pain, both physical
and mental-life become drudgery. lliness is effort against ourse!ves. lliness
strikes us as other, even when it becomes familiar. "The oppressive weight
of things" (Gadamer, 1996, p. 75) afflicts us in illness, our very being
Psicología desde el Caribe. Universidad del Norte. No. 11: 75-93, 2003
Health in the Light of a Critical Health Psychology
becomes a burden, a task, a chore. lliness is like a weight. With illness
can come anxiety. Gadamer (1996)indicates that "anxiety is intimate!y
connected with an oppressive senseof constriction, with sudden exposure
to the vastness and strangeness of the world" (p. 153). A serious illness
especiallycan "unmake the world" (Good, 1994;5carry, 1985),leaving us
with uncertain futures, uncertain economic status, uncertain senseof how
to go on, uncertain prospects of even living.
Fine, a word that has not been expropriated by any profession, as
health has, announces well-being. Fine means more than physical well-
being. The fact that we say "fine" in a perfunctory fashion is revelatory
of what the word says: to fee! fine or well indicates a hidden harmony,
which does not show itself. 50 it is overlooked, passed off, used
ironically: "It's fine," said as a brush-off. In health we are fine because
we can bear the burdens of existence with ease (Gadamer, 1996, p.
112).When we a.refine, there is here a rhythm of lightness and heaviness
of being: work and fatigue, enjoyment and suffering. Health, as being
fine, indicates a condition of "fulfilled self-realization" (Gadamer, 1996,
p. 71), which makes of health only uneasily inferior in a hierarchy of
goods .. That is, as soon as we would reduce health to a mere bodily
quality, we obscure its meaning as fine. Just as illness "proves" dualism,
health "proves" truth of psychosomatic unity, such that health is as
spiritual asphysical. In health and sickness, the ethical and the spiritual
refuse to pan company with the physical, even as they refuse to be
simply identified.
5TANDARDIZED HEALTH
Being-healthy, as presented above, drawing on phenomenological and
classical considerations, is not the whole story. Health is in our day a
profoundly political and economic reality, even as it is a medical and
moral reality. 5tudies that show the link between income leve! and
health, the differences in health standards among the various nations,
rich and poor, north and south, deve!oped and deve!oping, point to
the social and economic aspects of being healthy in the contemporary
world. In this world, the parameters of health are medical parameters.
In order to distinguish the phenomenological meaning of health as a
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way in which 1 live with the medical meaning of health as a quality of
my anatomically and physiologically defined body, I will call the
former "being-healthy" and latter "standardized health." Standardized
health is the object of medical and, by extension, political and economic
discourses. Sta:ndardized health is what medicine seeks to produce as
a product of médical inputs of drugs and surgery. Standardized health
is what politicians seek to improve in their policies. Low leve!s of
standardized health affect the economy and so become both a cost,
measured in demands on health care systems, lost productivity, etc.,
and a resource for the deve!opment of the service sector of the
economy. Standardized health is the object of both the politicalleft
and the political right.
CRITIQUE al' STANDARDIZED HEAL TH
Standardized health, as a property that I have, is clearly a good, and it
is our social reality. It defines in many ways how we strive to be healthy.
My critique centers precise!y on the good that results from standards
for health, and my aim is to propose that standardized health, despite
its benefits cannot be the aim of health psychology. My critique is
that standardized health is a technology of the self. It is a technology
of the self that corrupts our capacity for being re!ational.
My critique is re!ated to those of "healthism" defined, first, as
situating health care and responsibility on the leve! of the individual
(Crawford, 1980), thus obscuring the social causes of illness. Second,
healthism meam: the medicalization of behavior previously deemed
socially or politically problematic (Zola, 1978). Not only have ageing
and grieving become medicalized, but so has juvenile violence and, of
course, sexual activity. The basis of this form of healthism occurs
when health ceases to be a means and becomes an end in itself: Zola
(1978) cites the World Health Organization's (WHO) definition of
health to support the view that health has become the "very definition
of what is the good life" (p. 51). This sense of healthism is the most
obvious, in that studies show time and again corre!ations between
behavior pattern, and ill-health. Victim-blaming is of course out of
the question, but the facts speak for themse!ves, especially in the rich
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nations. Someone who treats all consumables as drugs, someone who
takes good care of his or her body, who seeks the services of health-
care professionals in a timely and appropriate manner and who mini-
mizes risky behavior, is likely to maximize the life cycle. Standardized
health informs you what your self is. Standardized health advocates
do not coerce, they promote.
Standardized health is an acid. An acid wash is good, but beyond a
certain point, it destroys. Standardized health is an acid wash that
precisely in its effectiveness, usefulness and goodness dissolves human
being into a form of homo oeconomicus. To this end, 1will present two
critiques of standardized health: Pirst, that its effectiveness has become
counterproductive, binding us ever more tightly to economic relations;
second, that the underlying commitment to equality in standardized
health leaves us polluted and fragmented to the very coreo The aim of
both these critiques will be to show the limits of standardized health
as a technology of the self.
Standardized he:dth is counterproductive
Counterproductivity does not refer to side-effects. By counterpro-
ductivity, Illich (1982) means that technological and economic
interventions into a cultural activity exceeding a certain limit produce
the opposite effects from those intended: "A social indicator that
measures a group- or class-specificfrustration resulting from the obliga-
tory consumptioll of a good or service ... Counterproductivity is the
result of a radical monopoly 01commodities over vernacular values" (pp.
15-16). Por example, beyond a certain point, automotive replacement
of walking disables people from moving from place to place; mandatory
schooling, beyond a certain point, makes most people incompetent if
they have not received a sufficient amount of educational inputs.
Scarcity is a ptecondition for counterproductivity: Scarcity, one
of the certainties of our epoch, is not the same as insufficient supplies.
Scarcity "defines 1:hefield in which the laws of economics relate (1)
subjects (possessive, invidious, genderless individuals-personal or
corporate, (2) institutions (which symbolically foster mimesis), and
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(3) cammadities, within (4) an environment in which the commons
have been transformed into resaurces, private or public" (Illich, 1982,
p. 19). The field defined by scarcity displaces the field defined by
subsistence. Illich argues "that economic value accumulates only as a
result of the previous wasting of culture, which can also be considered
as the creation of disvalue" (Illich, 1992, p. 76). Within a culture, a
person finds himself in the center of the world, and his labor, with
locally available means, provides for subsistence. A culture informs
the making ol' use-values, things made not primarily for the market
but for everyday living. A culture is a way of being-in the world, that
is, of inhabiting the world in a particular way.
Peaple have a native capacity far healing, cansoling, moving, learning,
building their houses, and burying their dead... These activitieshaveuse-
value without having been given exchange-value .... These basic
satisfactions become scarce when the social environment is transformed
in such a manner that basic needs can no longer be met by abundant
competence. The establishment of a radical monopoly happens when
people giveup their native ability to do what they can do for themselves
and for each other, in exchangefor something 'better' that can be done
for them only by amajor too!. Radicalmonopoly reflectsthe industrial
institutionalization of values (Illich, 1973, p. 54).
The modern disembedded economy, according to Karl Polanyi
(1957),marked a rupture with cultures and their grounding in subsisten-
ce living. Subsistence activities cannot be completely displaced, but
modern institutions such as education, medicine, transportation,
communications and entertainment have increasingly displaced them.
Modern economy, dominating and displacing autonomous activity, is
ersatz culture, replacing use-values with commodities that render us
helpless to subsist in any meaningful way.
The counterproductivity of standardized health is a consequence
of the imbalance between subsistent practices of healing, caring, being
sick, and staying well and industrialized health careo It shows in the
distinctions between legal and illegal drugs, in prescription and licensing
laws, in political clamor for increasing services and the right to be
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dependent on experts, in the loss of vernacular healing knowledges.
Most important, it shows in an increasing loss of liberty to declare
effective!y that one is well or ill and to pursue healing or not as one
sees fit. As health care improves, human neediness and dependence
deepens. Every liminal moment, every crisis, every transition has its
professionals, good intentioned people, to provide services. As standar-
dized health care progresses, so does its counterproductivity: More
he!plessness, more dependence, less subsistence. Standardized health
becomes sickening.
And it remains a scarce resource. Standardized health exists within
a field of scarcity: The need to maintain it, to recover it, to prevent
lapses from it requires commodities and professional service. Standar-
dized health is, moreover, a commodity in itself, as is clear from marke-
ting campaigns. There is, in addition, a positive correlation between
income leve! and standardized health. Health care is in principie scarce,
hence the politic,J battles over funding and allocation of resources.
The sacrifice for standardized health
Standardized health locates the self under the banner of universality
in Rousseau's sense: Particularity is sacrificed for the common good.
The sacrifices one makes are for the sake of a greater good, standardized
health. For this second critique, 1 extend an analysis of democracy
that the Lacanian theorist Zizek (1992) makes in terms of this Rou-
sseauian sacrifice or, in psychoanalytic terms, the superego. The
superego names " type of division and prohibition in our existence
that keeps our pleasures within the bounds of the social or symbolic
order. Ir names a kind of discipline we submit lO, but it is a peculiar
discipline. In Zizek's (1992) terms, "the superego is ... an agency of
the law exempted from its authority: it does what it prohibits us
from doing" (p. 159). Standardized health regulates our lives and
constitutes a superego. On a superficiallevel, this superego aspect of
health has lO do with pronouncements from, for example, the Surgeon
General of the United States on what is good and bad for us, with the
guilty pleasures of violating the rules, with defiance in not wearing a
seat belt or a motorcyc1e he!met, obsessive counting of calories, with
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guilt over worrying about fat while much of the world goes hungry.
These are the superficial yet necessary ways of health as a vindictive
good.
Standardized health cuts deeper into our being than that, making a
kind of ritual scar in existence, dividing us against ourselves, freeing
us to enjoy the benefits of standardized health. For the subject of stan-
dardized health, like that of democracy, is an abstraction, "the empty
punctuality we reach after subtracting al! its particular content" (Zizek,
1992, p. 163), Standardized health describes no one's health in
particular; it gives statistical averages and physiological norms, cali-
brated to account for ethnicity, gender, age and life style. Like demo-
cracy, standardized health rests upon the notion of equality: the anato-
mical atlas describes us al!, differences being "individual differences"
that do not imply preferemial treatment. Health in this way is based
on equality. Health, like democracy, then, is based on a "formal link"
(Zizek, 1992, p. 163)among abstract bodies and personality structures,
standardized tests, bureaucratic regulations. We're al! pink under the
skin, as an ami-racist slogan has it; we al!look the same in the
CATSCAN and the urine test.
The democratic subject and the subject of standardized health are
one and the same, as proponents of public health and critical health
psychology know: Only in a democratic system can standardized health
be in the grasp of the greatest number (Susser, 1993). More than an
analogy exists between democracy and standardized health. First,one
of the pressin¡; issues of the day is universal access to health care, to
correct an injustice of massive proportions. Second, studies of disease
causation have been criticized for not including female and minoriry
subjects. Standardized health will be truly standardized when all are
equally represented in objective studies as wel! as when al! are equal!y
treated. Third, advocates of extending the public health model to social
questions such as juvenile violent crime are typically proponents of
equality in other political issues. Four, Zola (1978), in his critique of
healthism, see,; in better representation a solution to the problems
healthism causes:
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As long as the deliverers of serviee are markedly different in gender,
eeonomie elass,and raee fram those to whom they offer serviees,aslong
asaeeessibility'lO mediealeare is a privilegerather than a right, as long as
the highest ineome graups are heahh eare prafessionals, as long as the
most prafit-making enterprises ineludethe pharmaeeutieal and insuranee
industries,soeietyisleftwith the uneomfortablephenomenon of aportion
of its population, living, and livingwell, off the sufferingsof others and
to someextent "venunwittingly havingavestedinterest in the continuing
existeneeof such prablems. (p. 66)
Contemporary demoeraeies have aecepted the premise that aecess
to health care is a right rather than a privilege, a premise possible only
because of the teehnological developments in health eare and
biomedieine. The result is an epoch-specifie meaning of democracy,
precisely what Foucault had in mind with the concept of biopower.
Health, like democracy, requires alienation fram organic, ethnic
communities, from the idiosyncrasies of personal measures of being
alive. Like democracy, standardized health occurs in a Gesellschaft,
not Gemeinschaft. 5tandardized health is possible only with a split
between the public (public health, the health of the population
understood as a set of equals with individual differences) and the private
(individual health facts which, as private property are pratected in
principie fram employers and others). Within the private realm, there
is another division, between what health care providers can measure
and what elude" measurement, my subjectivity. So the so-called
Cartesian split appears twice in the order of standardized health. Fram
before the moment when I leap in my mother's womb, I exist within
this "Cartesian" "ociety of public and private, objectively private and
subjectively private sectors. This alienation is not vicious but justo
Challenges to the democratic structure of standardized health occur,
for example, when the private threatens to be made public, so that
employees refuse to use mental health services because they fear it
will affect their jobs.
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Zizek builds on Freud's analysis of the discontents within civi-
lization, claiming that democracy fuels the superego because the
democratic abstraction cannot break ties to particularity: The "one
for all and all for one" of democracy has as its remainder the pathologies
of the nation-state in nationalism and ethnic tensions, in racism and
tribal and inteJ--family conflict: Those others threaten usoThe demo-
cratic subject makes a sacrifice, giving up the love of one's own-giving
up what the ancients called thymos-for the sake of participating in a
larger whole made up of equals under the law-a system of laws, not
men, as the slogan has it. What is sacrificed appears as the object of a
fantasy, a fantasy about something lost or threatened with loss, some-
thing that never existed, namely, the organic community. The
"materialized enjoyment" that accumulates in the superego, according
to _i_ek, has ics socialized outlets, such as the Olympics, and it its
pathological forms, such as the militia movements and the Ku Klux
Klan in the Uni.ted States, in street gangs. However, mainly it appears
in nostalgia for wholeness, for community, and in the meaner forms
of this longing in neighborhood exclusivity, gated communities, in
apocalyptic movies that destroy the status quo, and in the petty
resentments that the sacrifice entails. Ir shows up in the "idle talk"
(Heidegger's term) about stress as resulting fram life moving too fast,
fram living unnaturallifestyles.
For Zizek (1992), the strength of democracy is that it does not
succeed in breaking with ethnic and national particularity, that in fact
it cannot (p. 164). Renounced particularity, rootedness in blood and
soil, is the repressed of democracy. Thymos feeds upon us in our
discontent, this barking dog of piety and pity becoming the dirty secret
of hidden superiority. Devotion to the nation, to one' s region, to
something "we" possess and those others threaten to take from "us,"
organizes the forbidden enjoyment of dealing with them.
Standardized health, too, has its others, those who drain the health
care system. Those who will not or do not take care of themselves are
some of the others threatening the delivery of standardized health
careo Those who are not entitled to services are its others. Pregnant
teenagers, welfare mothers, smokers, drug addicts, the obese, people
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who do not wear seatbelts, immigrants, the very old, the very young,
the incompetent, the pOOl',etc. (depending upon point of view) are
the others who threaten Out health.
The sacrifice that produces standardized health is incomplete,
something is left over, and herein lies its sacred character, in Girard's
(1977)sense, thatis, when order and solidarity are secured by exclusion
of the scapegoat.
Just as democracy has its ground in the pleasures of the longing,
nostalgia, and hlmger for unity, so health has its grounding in
something we sacrifice for the sake of standardized health. Ir is
something we love or desire. What do we sacrifice for this health? Ir
is a love that we never fully renounce, indeed that we cannot relinquish,
and because of this remainder of what we desire, we can submit to the
discipline of standardized health. The what that we sacrifice is variable,
but it is forgetfulness, a forgetfulness of mortality, which allows
heedless enjoyment of the present without regard for the future.
"Everything 1 love is either illegal, immoral or fattening." So runs a
cliché, one that comains more truth than a barrelful of statistics. Plato's
Republic describecl the drink from Lethe that preceded the fall into
the body, for to live ahuman life one must forget death. This
"forgetfulness" is not denial or repression, it is the possibility for
celebration of living, an illusion lived joyfully.
This does not ¡:eem like a sacrifice. Is not maturity based on an
ability to anticipate outcomes, to delay gratifications and to plan? Such
maturity do es involve sacrifice. Standardized health demands
something more than renunciation of the pleasures of the here and
now. Ir requires the assumption of an Apollonian distance, in which
the flesh becomes purified in a universal discourse of rationality and,
increasingly, of systems thinking (Arney &Bergen, 1983). Standardized
health results from a disclosure of mortality. In its purifying revelation,
it conceals enjoyment-what Levinas calls "living from ... " and leisure-
in what it looks to it like our stupid enjoyments and wastes of time.
For standardized health rests on a bedrock of knowledge, specifically
knowledge that ElI,,1refers to in terms of la technique. This knowledge
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is effective, saving, improving, prolonging lives. Because it is knowledge
and knowledge tied to instrumental power, it requires the sacrifice of
lethe and leisure.
In other words, we sacrifice wholeness for standardized health:
Hence the yearnings for holistic health and the dissatisfaction with
biomedicine. This lost state, however, never existed. The fantasy of
health is that of wholeness; the recovery of health is the recovery of a
lost unity, a "renewing of a lost community" (Goldstein, 1959,p. 186).
The pursuit of standardized health seeks this recovery, one that is
precisely impossible, especially if I seek it in this standardized way.
We sacrifice a good for a greater good, for the benefits that follow.
Tied to this sacrifice is pollution. The more we know about standar-
dized health, the more polluted we become. The scrutiny of health
care, the discovery of new risks, and establishment of genetic liabilities
expose ever more frailties and defects, in an effort to contain death.
Our limitations increase exponentially. The pollution is the loss of
unity, wholeness, and oneness that standardized health "alienates" us
from. As we a~;sumethe identity of people with standardized health,
we assume the purity of the point of view that produces that
knowledge, either directly or vicariously, in our devotion and
dependence upon health care providers. (More and more, it is self-
help, as people become more empowered as health care decision ma-
kers.) This perspective, this Apollonian distance, views us as the flawed,
defective objects that we are. The more we know, the more polluted
we become. A dean bill of health, the pleasure of being within normal
limits, enjoys ¡he judgment against uso The cleanliness is that of a
fragmented existence.
Becausewe know more-the quantitative aspect is decisiveÑthe more
we are flawed. The greater the knowledge and the care, the more we
need it. The less can we let nature take its course, since "nature" has
been supplemented by expertise. How does the superego aspect of
this dynamic show itself? In the demand for more services, in the
sense of helplessness when deprived of it, in the delight of hearing
about the surgeries and diseases of the rich and the famous, in the
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obsession and hypochondria that accompanies standardized health, in
the endless vigilance it demands.
In making a real difference in some cases and warding off death, in
the vigilance of prevention and check-ups, in managing risks and placing
a wider circle of activities under medical auspices, standardized health
increases anxiety. Someone with an unknown ailment may be relieved
to receive a diagr..osis, but it is the relief of a diagnosis. Feeling anxious,
people seek out standardized health careo The anxiety keeps us locked
in, maintaining the identity of a health-services client. The anxiety
signals renunciation and vulnerability, which is answered by the
ministrations of health careo Anxiety acts like an engine, increasing
demand for serv:icesand the reassurances of expertise. In anxiety, we
fall (in the Heideggerian sense) upon the abstractions of standardized
health.
Standardized health is based on a remainder of forgetfulness and
leisure rooted in an imagined primal unity, not in defiant refusal to
watch one's health. The love of our own flesh that in our bad habits
messes up standardized health, is both enjoyment and punishment for
enjoyment. Those others who do not renounce forgetfulness and
leisure are the despised ones, those who wallow in pollution. The
ancient notion of pollution held that disease comes from the gods or,
as Job's friends held, from having done evil. The more we view
ourselves in terms of standardized health, the more polluted we
become: Our he~Jth is "smeared" with the enjoyment of being polluted.
Standardized he~.lth care does not blame the victimÑsuch thinking is
forbiddenÑand that interdiction intensifies the way that standardized
health is shadowed with the pleasures of purity. Instead of reciting
out loud a litany of our sins and vices, we confess elevated PSA levels,
body fat ratio, ¡he number of bypasses we've hado In an age of
standardized health, our heroes are those who undergo medical
treatment. Fearful and proud, we parade our scars and lab reports,
visible evidence of our ordeals and survival.
Finally, as Zizek (1992)writes: "The democratic attitude is always
based upon a certain fetishistic split: 1 know very well (that the
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democratic form is just a form spoiled by stains of 'pathological' imba-
lance), but just the same (I act as if democracy were possible)" (p. 168).
Standardized health is possible only with a similar split: 1 know very
well that standardized health is knowledge that pollutes me as it
becomes more effective, but al' the same time 1 act as if 1will measure
up. 1know verr well that standardized health is based on an abstraction
that cuts us off from a fantasized community and wholeness, but al'
the same time 1 pursue health as making me whole. The very same
abstraction that suppons democratic society, its remainder of lost
community, suppons standardized health.
Without standardized health, there is no democracy: There would
be millions fol' fighter jets and land mines, but not for an ICU in a
pediatric unit of a hospital. We cannot do without alienating stan-
dardized health. Standardized health is a modern "conscience" 01'
superego: Impanial, beneficial, liberating: It frees us to be ourselves,
so long as we submit 1'0 the sacrifices it requires.
Standard health, econorny and dernocracy
The first critique connected standardized health with the economy,
and the replacement of subsistence by scarcity and the creation of a
disembedded horno oeconomicus. The second critique connected
standardized heaIth with the universal subject of democracy. Scarcity
and equality constitute the law upon which standardized health rests.
Conforming our lives to these laws promises a measurable well-being,
even as it saddles us with an ever larger burden of neediness and
pollution. As its knowledge saves our lives, it reveals our infirmities.
Even if we can outlive our organs, we succumb in the end 1'0 the flat
line. Healthism here affirms the friends of Job in their condemnation
of the suffering man on the dung heap. The major difference between
the friends of Job and the advocates of standardized health is that the
neediness and pollution fall upon our own brows, even on the heads
of those who administer standardized health careo There is no outside
1'0 its system. In scapegoating ourselves collectively, we have the
discontents of health, which al' least puts a check on the scapegoating
of the others.
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This analysis blocks any desire for the pasto The deepest danger
lies not in the alienating effects of standardized health, but rather in
the totalitarian impetus in holistic health. A hallmark of totalitarianism
is the absence oI distinction between private and public. The obvious
case occurs when private health information is used against an
individual. It is a constant batde around the edges, but the principIe
has been enunciated. The other case involves health psychology, when
the boundary between the so-called objective and the so-called
subjective becornes blurred. When my spiritual well-being becomes a
factor in my standardized health, or when providers of standardized
health must describe and measure such things, then the "Cartesian"
boundary has been breeched, and the individual must confess all in
the name of health. This undoing of the split happens when health
ceases te be a means and becomes an end in itself. Then it is on the
road to totalitarianism. Health psychology is particularly dangerous
in this regard, insofar as it threatens te extend expertise te the spiritual
and inner life 01 individuals and communities.
Standardized health reveals our condition, concealing it in the
process. The lo;t object, wholeness, is an impossible one. The truth
of standardized health is that it recognizes its impossibility even as it
incites us to pursue it.
CRlTICAL HEAL TH PSYCHOLOGY AS A DISCIPLINE
A critical health psychology does not have a privileged position outside
the order that constitutes standardized health. However, if it is te be
a critical health psychology, it must not lend additional substance,
insofar as it is able, to the idle talk about standardized health. The
temptation to intensify submission with the law that produces and
sustains it, because of the benefits in terms of professional recognition
and economic rewards and the sheer pleasure of it, can perhaps be
surpassed. Perhaps.
More than better qualitative research methods, critical health
psychology could begin by relativizing standardized health. How to
do this? Take the WHO definition of health, that cliché of enlightened:
91
Psicología desde el Caribe. Universidad del Norte. No. 11: 75-93, 2003
92 ROBERT KUGELMANN
"Health is a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being
and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." Begin by saying,
N o, health is not this at al!. At best, standardized health is a means to
well-being, but it is also an impediment, since it disables, fragments
and increases tbe burden of pollution. And what is this "well-being,"
so obviously good? My being is a being-toward-death: How could 1
learn about that witholit physical, mental, and social distress and illness?
Critical health psychology needs to reflect and debate what the good
life might mean, to which end health could be a means. Critical health
psychology needs to explore the benefits and virtues of ill-health, so
as to free them from the stigma of pollution. Critical health psychology
needs to reflect on death as the end of human life, not as something to
be eliminated, as in medical fantasies of endless youth and life, but as
a positive force.
A critical bealth psychology must devote itself to ends: to
articulating being healthy as amode of existence, of being-in-the-world
prereflectively. And it must devote itself to articulating standardized
health in all its implications, not simply those dear to its priesthood.
And herein lies the greatest danger. For if we oppose being-healthy
and standardized health, we feed the superego, as it were. Being-
healthy, when ~:eenas something superior to standardized health, as a
higher, more a·~thentic mode of existing, becomes a form of purity
more vicious than any measure of health. In tying being-healthy to
dwelling, and not surpassing the dialectical opposition between being
healthy and standardized health, health psychology would become an
instrument of the pleasures of purity.
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